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Preiace
The NASA Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST) has established the
goal of providing a technology base so that NASA can accomplish future missions with
a several•urders•of•magniwde increi se in mission effectiveness at reduced cost. To reahie
this goal, a highly focused program must he established advancing technologies that
promise substantial increases in capability and/oi substantial cost savings. The Study
Group on Machine Intell.gence and Robotics was established to assist NASA technology
program planners to determine the potential in these areas. Thus. the Study Group had
the following objectives:
(I )	 To identify opportunities for the application of machine
intelligence Lnd robotics in NASA missions and systems.
(2) To estimate the benefits of successful adoption of machine
intelligence and robotics techniques and to prepare forecasts
of their growth potential.
(3) To recommend program options for research. advanced devel-
opment, and Implement , :ion of machine intelligence and
robot technology for use in p rogram planning.
(4) To broaden c0111 III among NASA Centers and un&
varsities and other ie .earch organizations currentl y engaged in
machine intelli gence and robotics research.
•
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Section I
Introdu^tion
file NASA Study Group tin Machine Intelligence and
Robotics including many of the leading researchers and almost
all of the leading research groups in the fields of artificial
intelligence, computer science, and autonomous systems in
the United States, niet to study the influence of these subjects
oil full range of NASA activities and to make recommenda-
tions on how these subjects might in the future assist NASA in
its mission. The Study (Troup, chaired by Carl Sagan, was
organized by Ewald liter, JPL, at he request of Stanley Sadin
of NASA licadquariers. It included NASA personnel, scientists
who have worked on previous NASA missions, and experts on
computer science who had little or no prior contact with
NASA. The Group devoted about 2500 ratan-hours to this
study, meeting as a full working group or as subconinuitees
between June 1977 and December 1978.
A number cf NASA Centers and facilities were visited
during the study. In all cases, vigorous support was offered for
accelerated development and use of machine intelligence in
NASA systems, with particularly Linn backing offered by the
Director of the	 Smecetli 1tt Center, whuch we cun-
seder especially significant because of 1SC's central rule in the
development of manned spaceflight.
This report includes the conclusions and recommendations
of the Study Group. A complete report ss ith supporting docu-
mentation will be published separately. The conclusiors
represent  group consensus, although occasionally thew were
dissenting opinions on individual conclusions or recommenda-
tions. 111ulc the report is critical of past NASA efforts in this
field — and most often of the lack of such efforts -- the cri-
ticisms are intended only as constructive. The problem is
government-wide, as the Federal Data Processing Reorgani-
zation Project' has stressed, and NASA has probably been
one of the least recalcitrant Federal agencies inaccom-
modaung to this new ;ethnology.
fhe Study Group believes that the effective utilization of
existing opportunities in computer science, machine intelli•
gence, and robotics, and their applications to NASA•spetific
problems will enhance significandy the cost-effectiveness and
total information return from tuture NAS/. activities.
Section 11
NASA Needs
NASA is, to a significant degree, an agency devoted to ,he
acquisition. processing. and analysis of information — about
the Farth, the solar system, the stars, and the universe. The
principal goal of NASA's booster and space vehicle commilit-
mcnt is to acquire such scientific information for the benefit
of the human species. As the years have passed and NASA has
mustered an impressive array of successful missions, tine com-
plexity of each mission has increased as the instrtumentailon
and scientific objectives have become more sophisticate: ar.d
the amount of data returned has also incrcaseJ dramaticaily.
The Manner 4 mission to Mais in 1965 was considered a strik-
ing success when it returned a few million bits of information.
T'l,c Viking mission to Mars, launched a decade later, acquired
almost tell 	 antes more information. Comparable
advances have been made in Earth resources and rneteoro-
logical satellites, and across the full range of NASA acuvi.,es.
At the present time, the amount of data made available by
NASA missions is larger than scientists can comfortably sift
throuch. This is true, for example, of Land-sat and other Earth
resources technology satellite missions. A typical information
acquisition rate in the I 980 is about 10 12 bits per day for all
NASA systems. Ill 	 years, this is roughly the total non-
pictorial information content of the Library of Congress. The
'U.S. Office of Management and Budget. Federal Data hucessing
Reurgani:ation Stud)', Available from National TCChnICdl Information
Service, %A%hington, D.C.
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problem is clearly renting much Nurse. We have reached a
severe hnutation to the tradltianal wry of acquiring and
ar1.11) /iflg d.,ta.
A iccent study at J1 r l. estimates that NASA could save
1 5 billion dollars per year by 2'000 A.0 through serious
implementation of machine intelligence. Given different
assumptions. the saving might he several times less or sc"tAl
tinies inure. It is clear, however, that the efficiency of NASA
a.:uvitics in bits of information per dollar and in new data
acquisituan opport Lint tics would be very high were NASA to
utilvc the full range of modern computer science in its mjs-
sions. Because of the enormous current and expectedadsances
to m ichinc intelligence and computer science, it seems possible
that N ASA could achieve otders -of-inagnitude improvement ui
mi:;Aon effectiveness at reduced cost by the I 990s.
Modern compute: systems, if appropriately adapted, are
expected to be fully capable of extracting relevant data tither
on board the spacecraft or on fire ground ►n user-compatible
forn ► at. Thus, the desired output might be a direct grepliie
display of snow cover, or crop health, or global alhedo, or
:mineral resources, or storm system development, or hydro-
logic cycle. With machine intelligence and modern computer
graphics, in immense an ► ount of data can be analyzed ar,d
reduced to present the scientific or technological results
directly in a convenient form. This sort of data-wlnno%iiig
and content analysis is becoming possible, using the develop.
ing techniques of machine intelligence. But it is likeiy to
remain unavailable unless considerably more relevant research
and systems development is undertaken by NASA.
The cost of ground operations of spacecraft missions and
the number of operations per cornnnand upinnked from ground
to spacecraft are increasing dramatically , (Figures 2 . 1 and 2.2).
Further development of automation can, at the same time,
dramatically decrease the operations costs of complex missions
and dr rnatically increase the number and kinds of tasks per-
formed. and therefore, the significance of the data returned.
Figures 2 .3 and 24 illustrate schematically , how in ► prov.4
autom: tion can produce a significant decline in the cost of
mission operations. The projected reallocation of responsibihty
during mission operations between ground based hurnans and
^pacecrift computer processing is shown in Figure 2-5 There
ale many simple or repetitive tasks which existing machine
intelligence technology is fully capable of dealing with more
rehably and less expensively than if human beings were in file
loop. This, in turn, frees human experts for more difficult
judgmental tasks. In addition, existing and projected advances
in robot technology would largely supplant the fired for
n ► .uined missions, with a suh%tzimal reduction in cost.
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Figure 2 . 1.	 Trend of m.tsion ground operations costs. Increasing
mission complexity and duration contribute to the
ground operation costs.
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Figure 2 2.	 Trend of spacecraft automation. As a relative indicator,
the level of automation is measured by the different
elementary functions the spacecraft can perform in an
unpredictable environment between ground commands.
A TOJ fold improvement through advanced automation
.s projected by the year 2000.
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	 Improvement through advanced automation is projected
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Section III
Technologicai Opportunities
Wichine intelligence and robo t ics are not only relevant but
essential to life enure range of future ' : ',SA activities. Conlenl
analysis of t.arth orbita l and planetary 1 acecraft results is
merely one application. Other iphh,alions ex -t: in mission
operations, in spacccraft crisis management. in large construc-
tions in Firth orbit or on the Moon, and in mining in the lunar
or asteroidal environments. These List ipplications are proba-
bly at least a decade into the future, but $()life e_:.emit preps.
rations for theirs would seem prudent. These preparations
night include the dcsclopment of teleuperators, manipulative
devices which are connected via a radio feedback Loup with a
human being, so that, for example, when the human tin the
Farth stretches out his hand, the mechanical hand of the
teleoperitor in Farth orbit extends likewise: or when the
ltun ► an turns his head to the left, the telcoperator's cameras
turn to the left so thit the human controller can see the
coresponding field of view. Where the light travel times ire on
the order of a tenth of a second ur less, the telcoperatur mode
can wore: readily. For repetitive operations, such as girder
Construction and quality control in large space structure,.
autoinition and machine intelligence will play a major rule u ►
.any efficient and cost-effective design.
In planetary exploration in the outer solar system, the
light-travel times range from tens of minutes to nt'my hours.
As i result, it is often useless for a spacecraft in trouble to
radio the Earth fior ins: , uctions. In ratan) cases. the mstnic.
tions will have arrived tut) late to avoid catastrophe. Thus, the
Viking spacecraft during entry had to be able to monitor and
adjust angle of attack, atino.pheric drag, parachute deploy-
ment, and ictro•rocket Brute. Roving vehicles on %lies, Titan.
and the Galilean satellites of Jupiter will have to know how to
avoid obstacles during terrain traverses and how not to fall
down crevasses. The development of nwden ► scientific space-
craft fie involves pushing back the frontiers of ma-
chine intelligence.
In our opinion, machine intelligence and tubutics is wte of
the Iew arras wh.re spinoff justifications fur NASA activities
are valid. In most such ar guments. socially useful applica-
tions. such as cardiac pacemakers. are used to justify , very.
large NASA expenditures directed toward quite difR•ent
objectives. lint it is easy, to sec that the direct development u:
the application, ml this case the pacemaker, could have been
ic,wilpinshcd at a tiny fraction of the cost of the activity
whtsh it is used to justify -- the Apollo program. say. How-
CVC t , because there is so hide development in machine intelli-
1:encr rnd robotics elsewhere mu the government (or in the
pr:vale sector), spinoff arguments fior NASA involvement ill
such activities scent to have some substantial validity. In the
lung trim. practical terrestrial applications might include
undersea nunetil prospecting and filming, conventional mining
(of coal, for eximple), automated assembly of devices, micro.
:urger) and robotics prosthetic devices. the safe operation of
nucle.ir power plants or other industries which have side
effects potentially dangerous for human hcalth.ind household
robots. A further discussion of future NASA ippl ►cations of
machine intelligence and robotics, and possible spinoff of
:hcse activities, is given in the supporting documentation.
With the development of integrated circuits, microprocessors
rnd silicon chip technology, the capabilities of computers leave
b:cii growing at in astonishing rate. Figures 3 . 1 through 3-4
provide ail estimate of recent past and projected future descl-
opments. By such criteria as memory storage, powCf Oft.
cicncy, site and cost. the figures of merit of computer systems
have been doubling ipprolimilely every year. 1 his implies a
thousand-fuW improvement ri a decade. lit anuthei decade
the processor and mentor\ Ifour mullion words) of the IBM
370,;68 wall probably be huusible in a cube about five centi•
meters on a side (although computer irchitestuie different
1n intciv%ling possible ipl,li.atioii of gencrid purrow r„botics tesh•
nolop i% pnwidrd b) the nuclear accident it the three \tile Wind
reactor facility near Harrisburg. Penns)himi in 1lirch i'Apri1 1979.
ie buildup of a high pre+wrc tritium bubble had is one possible
solution the turning of a sahe in a shimber under mo meters of water
impre'nited with ser) hi gh radiation !lases. Thu a in r\ircmely
ditft.ult ensmunrncnt for humins, but  pliusible one 1cr adsinced
mul7t•ru i^ , ^e rob„ts. The stationing of such roboh is safety dew-:a
in nua:ir power plints is one conceisable objective of the dc%ef.iP-
inent of robotics technology. Generally, such multi-purpose rotwi%
ni } , ht he stationed in all ipprupriite industrial facilities whet. •i}r,.
ficint hizirds to employee or public health or to the facile.) itself
esists.
Shortly after the Three Mile Island reictot acciden t ine operating
compan) bran recruiting 'jumpers," individu -ls of short stiture
wtlhng. for compirili%cl) high wages, to 511''eC !
 ,ormwhcs to high
radiation doses thot —lit inappropriate for nermam • ni reactor tech-
nicians t. ew York times. Jul) , 16. 1979 page H. ine :unsrn-ns are
often no more difricuit thin turning a K't, bu in a radian, n emiton•
mint of tens of rc •ns per hour. 11 , ri - would appeal to be strung
humimtifiin reawns for cr„plo) mg sinell -nulti-purpl- s, sell-propelled
robots for this tunction, a..vel: as t . ;cdetign nuclear r, wcr plants to
male much fuller use of the apibihties tit mashme inwIli^,rice. the
competent use of machine ir:clligence and robotics is in imrurtint
component of ill recent) proms:, additional energ) sources — fur
example. mining and pro.essing shi,:! and coal.
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i 730-51Rent diet cif the 101 370116% will pruhahly he considered
dcNn.tblcl. It Is dlflcult to think of another ,Ere& of recent
1.'4 hnulu^^>' which has undergone so many spectacular Improve
tilcnts ail sit $114111 a pcnud of tittle
This steep rate of change in computer technology is one
maho; factor in the obsolescence of NASA cornputer systems.
Nc1s systems are being developed sit fast thit project scientists
anti engineers, mission directors, and other NASA officials
h,. ► e diff (Lilly discovering what the latest advances are, mkl:h
Irss ulcorptiraling them Into spacecraft mission or ground•
operations deign.
AnuthLr problem is the competition between short-term
and 1,mg-teim objective% In the light of the NASA budget
cycle. Major funding is given fur specific mission:. There is a
high premium on the success of individual missions. The safest
wurst alwa) s seems to be to use a corn cuter s) stem which
has already been tested successfully in some previous mission.
But most missions have five• to ten-year lead times. The net
result is that the saint obsolete systems may he flown fora
decade or mote. This trend can he seen in areas other than
cumputer technology, as, for example, in the NASA reliance
in lunar and planetary exploratlor, for 15 years tin vidicun
technulog) , well into a period when commercial manufac-
tures were fit) lungei producing the vidicun systems and
NASA was relying on previously swckpiled devices. 'ibis has
been the case sine 1962. Oil) with the Galileo mission, In
1984, will more advanced and photometrically accurate
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Figure 3 . 1. Data storage technology. The storage capacity
is doubling every 1-112 years, whereas the cost
of random access memory is halving every
2-112 years. In 1960, the equivalent of
1 it. stored a 15 page pamphlet, in 1980, the
same space will accommodate a 2000 book
library and in 1990, the entire Library of
Congress.
100	 __.	 I	 I	 i	 to-?
1960	 1970	 1900	 1990
YEAR
Figure 3 2. Active devices technology. The numbs; of attire
components per cubic centimeter is doubling every
1-1/6 years, whereas the average cost per log c gate
I$ halving every 2-112 years.
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Figure 3 3. Bubble memory technology. About 4 n 108 bits/cm2
would be reached in 1985. This implies a bubble
diameter of 10 -5 nn, which is ten times greater
than the theoretical limit. (Adapted from
A.N. Boback, Bell Laboratory, ELECTRO '77,
N. Y.I.
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the failure rate is halving every 2-7/4 years.
charged-coapled device system% be employed. The problem is
much more severe when it applies to a field undergoing such
dramatic advances as computer technology. The management
dynamics can he understood, !hut it is nevertheless distressing
to discover that an agriw) as dependent on high technology as
NASA, an otganitation identified in public etc %oh effec•
live use of computer technology, has been so sluggish in adopt•
ing advances made inure than a decade earlier. and even
slowrr in prunwuu te or encouraging lieu►
 advances in nihotics
and nnachine Intelligence.
Pie general technological practice of adopting for long
periods of time the first system which works at all rather than
developing the optimal, most cost-effective gsteni has been
amply documented s This phenomenon Is by no means
restricted to NASA. The need to handle radioactive substances
led many years ago to the development of tudimentary tel.--
operators. At first progress wits rapid, with force reflecting,
two lingered models appearing In the early 1950%. But this
development all hilt stopped when progress was sufficient to
make the handling of radioactive materials possible rather
than easy, or economical, or completely safe. This occurred in
part because the nuclear industry, like NASA. became
nussion-oriented at this little. Since then, thv development of
crnnputer -cont rolled manipulators has proceeded slowly on
relatively sparse funding, and there has heen little drive to
understand in a general and scientific May the n, ture of
manipulation. %tabor advances seem simila; , ,.!Led and like•
wile entireiy feasible in such areas as locomotion reseat,:h,
automated assembly, self-programming, obstacle avoidance
during planetary landfal l , and the development of spacecraf!
crisis anal sis systehls.
Simon, Herbert, A., The New .Science of .tlartairernenr Decision,
Prentice (tall. Inc., 1977.
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Section IV
Conclusions and Recommendaticinis
Ne hcheve that NASA %hould inottute a vigorous and lung•
ran t•c prufratn to m:urpowle and keep pace with stateol•the-
art de%elopments in computer technology. both tit its space•
boitic and its ground bawd computer systems; and to ensure
that advances, tanlured to NASA's mission, continue to he
made in machine intelligence and robotics. Such advances will
not occur of their own accord. Many NASA requircn ►ents in
computer architecture and suhs)stcm design will to turn have a
stimulating effect on the American cumputcr and ini.rupiu-
cessor industry. which new faces an extremely strong chal•
lenge by foreign cunilxuton. We believe that an agency such
as \.%SA, which is de%oted to the sophisticated acquisition
and anal) %is of data, must play a rnuJi more vigotous rule in
the d. %ten and acquisition of data processing %) stems than has
been its practice ill 	 past.
These findings are supported by the reconuncndation%
mdependentl) arrived at by the Space Science Board of the
National Academy of Sciences:4
From experience with ni/sslon operatio ►► s ..n
pre%sous space missions, we anticipate that theic
%%ill he even greater demands on data acquisition.
processilil;, and storage: on mission coordination.
and oil with the ,pacecraft and scicnti•
tic expenn ►ents. rile complex nature of mission
operations and the lung time scale required to pre•
pare. certify, and uansinit routine commands in
previous missions indicates that substantial changes
%%ill he netts%ary. We believe that significant tech•
nical and managerial ad%'antes must be r..ade in
anticipation of future planetary missions. :n order
to provide reliable, more efficient. and lowei cost
%)stems for operation of the spacecraft and scien-
titic instruments.
The testing of these systems on the ground as
operational units includin g the participation of
science teanis should be carried out well before the
mission. These tc%ts should include the operation
with possible failure modes. The%eapproaches it-ill
he more i►upi,rtant tit the Jicture when extensive
c4)ordinathrli misit he obtained b)- use of more
intelli:cw or aui(monions control s)-stenis The
4 Srratekv Jur 6xploratinn of the Inner Plaoiers- 1977 /987. Corn-
millet on 1 11.1netary and lunar F%ploration. Sparc Science Boatd.
A%%e1n1 % 1 411 %failionancal .ind Physical Sciences, National Rewarch
(„until. Nan(nal Acadcrm or Scrcnce%, Wa%hin}ton. D.C.. 1978.
cl.owe of onboard pt priKe»in= versus earth bawd
processing and the utility of block ielcnicrry fur•
mating and di%tribuuve data ha p olnnK and control
sub%)% g ems will require asst%shunt In the past.
computing facilities and command and data.
processing %oftware were not always efficient. and
early attention was not given to overall system
design in la) ing out n ► i%%nons. Further, experience
%%ith past and current spacetlittht nus.ion% has
shown that complicated system ► with higher levels
of Intelligence are diflicult to handle without
tuh)talitlal c\pcnence.
%1e are apprehensive about reconunendill g that
radical new apliroache% he ut ► Ived without further
study. nonetheless, it appears that some significant
changes must be considered Recognizing that nu%•
siun operations is the key to the success of
coniphcared undertaking, ive therefore recolri ►►iel ►J
that air assesiment of mission 1 iperations, arc ludtng
spacceraft colrrrol and scientirle initniniclit and
aata llianage ►►iellt and the destgli anJ Ina,lagc ►►►ent
of softscare co ►itrol s) • ste ►ns, be studied hi , the
Agenc.i • at slip earliest poossible emit and the eialua
tier ► be presented io the Colmintttee
The Federal Data I'roccssing Reorganization Project has
indicated serivas lathing: in virtuall} all government agencies
in the uuhzation of modern computer technology Nhile the
National Science Foundation and the Advanced Research
Project Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense con•
time to support some work in machine intelligence and
robotics. this work, especially that supported by ARPA. is
becoming more and more ntission•onented. The amount of
fundamental resear,h supported by these agencies in machine
intelligence and robotics is quite small. Because of its mission.
NASA is uniquely suitable as the lead civilian agency in the
federal government fur the development of frontier technology
In cumputcr science, machine intelligence. and robotics.
NASA's general engineering coninciencc and ability to carry
out complex missions is widely noted and admired. These arc
just the capabilities needed by any federal agency designaied
to develop these fields. Although %%c are hardly experts on
federal budgetary deliberations. it scorns to us possible that
incremental funds might he made available to NASA. over and
above the usual NASA budget. if NASA were to make a com-
pelling ca%e for becoming the lead agency in the development
of frontier technology in computer science and applications.
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11 ►.• Ih• n.Iivla) m ► pact of su.h a slep fur the fl ► dustnal ect ►►►un►y,
fill ether Mall: W% of gosensment, for tl ►e public well-being,
and lot NASA's imn future effccsiveness in an era of tight
hudg.tls is likely Io he ►uhst.,nUal.
We here state our overall cunclusanss and reaann ►enJa•
lions. the complete report with supporting documentation
leading to these conclusions and mtcununenditiuns still be
pul/lished ><ililately.
A. CONCLUSIONS
Cimclusion J. '%ASA is S t 1.5 .rears behind the leadi►rX wipe
Al cu►riputer sc •ie►►ce and ieclr► ( ►logt•.
There are sonic c-santp'. r of excellence, but to general
we find NASA's use of computer technology disippumtlilt.
NASA installations still einpluy punched•card•ba.ed hatch
processing and obsolete inad ► inc languages. There is no
NASA nitiom.We con ► puter net"mk and no widespread
tin ►e•sliving use of computers. Although Viking was a
brilliant success. given its design Imitations.
Vikinc's use of robotics technolog) and in situ program.
mu ► g Has rudimentary. These ic.hniques nitw. he greatlN
advan:ed for tilt complex misswns of the future, both
planetary and Earth orbital. Most Firth-sateliot: and much
planetary exploratwn imaging data remains unanal%/ed
be:aU.K of the absence of auton ► ited systems :apiblc of
perforciing oinient analyses. Even missions bring planned
I'm the 1980s are being demunied almost ex:lusivcly for
traditional data :ollection ssth little apparent provision
being mad( for automated e ,stri:tion of content infor•
oration.
Conclusion 2 Techin, ►log► • decisions arc, to much tut great a
dexrce, dictated lay specific missio ►t goals, powe ►fullY inipeding
,VAS.4 unh:ation of ►►► cxlern contputcr science and tcch ►nologv.
Unlike nit pioneering ►cork in other areas of science and tech.
noble/, -VASA 's use of c„mputer science airJ machine inteNi-
gt,lic•e has been c•onsen-ative and unimaxi ►nani-e.
Sttet funding Iimitatiuns and in understandable aversion
to mission failmi. :ause nussion directors to settle for
proven hilt obsolete and, ironically• often very expensivT
Iechnulogres and systems. As machine intelli gence ai.d
iohoti:s continuo to advance outside of NASA, the co p se-
yuen:es of +lies tradtums for higher cost and less efficient
Jana return ► and analysis become more glaring. The Inertial
fixation tin I5-ycar•old te:hnolugles, including slow pro-
cessors and very limited mem+iries, strongly inhibit NASA
contact ssuh and vandaoon of advanced mi:huie intelli•
geoce tc:hni4ucs. Flight n ► utrculnputer n ►einunes ale t) p-
ically at I00M or :1.(X1) words. enormously resincting
upUcNtt. (Fur e>,annple. a very Ia1Ke number of scitnUllc
targets on Jupoct and the Gahle.+n satellites, whwh other•
ssn.e could be required. h.:d t. ► he abandoned beaus: of
the memory 111tlltatil)flf Of the Voyager +inhuard c ► •rnpt-ter.)
Holt million byte ntcrt ►uries ale flow ruutincly employed a11J,
on:c %Iict•qualficd, could pru ► ide enormous net► ibility.
liecause of the lung lead lime~ in the planning cycle. many
decisions relating to computers are made fist to seven )ears
WON laull,lt. Often. the :urnputer techn„logy , invoked is
bidl y ohsulete at the time hirdssare is fn ►ten. Further. nu
deliberate effort is tirade to provide flexibility (or softssarc
developments in the lung time interval before nussiun
operations. Illphnknq nuuu ►n programs after launch is a
small but significann Steil set the light direction.)
Opitchrshin J. The overall importance of machine brtellixenre
amid robotics for AAS•I has not been ►cidelr appreciated
within the agcnc) •, anJ AASA has made no sc ► •i.n► s of oft to
attract Michl, ) ,ou ►mg scientists tit these fields.
In 1978/1147 4), the Space Systems in j Tc:hnulogy Advisory
i on ► mittee of the NASA Ads ►sor) Cotimil had 40 inept.
bets. Not one was a cunnl"Wer scientist. illhough two had
petipherillY tetited initre.ts. Few. if any, of the hest :uni-
puler science I'hl)s from the leading acidemi: Institutions
in the field work for NASA. Thelc is a looped causalO
%wh NASA's general ha:kwardness in :omputcr ulowe
(Conclusion I I 1n tntproverncnt of the quality ufconnputer
science at NASA cannot be ac:umplished without high
quality professionals: but such professionals :annut he
attia:ted without up•tu•datc facilities and the mandate to
work at the leading edge of the field.
The problems si n madied In Conclusions I and 3 cannot
he solved separatel;'.
Conclusion 4. The athancrt; and developments in machine
inte•llicence and robotics needed to make fi ► ture space ►nissi nos
econ• mical and feasible mil not happen ►vnh, nit a nta/+,r long-
tenn eonimit►► icnr and centrah:ed. cuo► Jinatcd support.
A sunnnary of various planned future space missions and
an estimate o r technology develupntcnt efforts needed to
autonnate their system functions is given in the Appendix.
N ithout these automatic system functions. (;:any of the
missions \sill nut be economically and/or technologl:ally
feasible.
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0. RECOMMENDATIONS
Rec,nn ►neoidatfon 1 NASA shi^i ld adopt a /std i' til r' ►x,prous
find i►►Idx►►►rm r research if, cuntl4st r %then, •$, mat hi►se w ► tr111•
xrncr good roh.)tics in sofpj?(w1 of hr(wd .VAS•1 ub/ectires.
Tit.- problems sumrnarwd in the preceding It%t of conclu
11011% live solutions. They requre must of all an awareness
that tilt probitnl • exist end a conr11atillent of resources to
solve them. Table 4 . 1 gives the published RAI) budgets of
the seven largest computer corporatiuns in life United
Stales In all casts. the total KAI) %pendulit is greater than
4p'^ of tutal prulits. Tilt	 ne ad%a:cd R&D budget would l,c
only a fraction of this amount. lwrding corporations In
computer science and le.hnolugy chafJocrlftically s pend
S percent of Bros% earnings on relevant research and de%el.
opulent. lie %acne percentage of NASA 's annual expendi-
ture in computer-related activities would %uggest all allrlual
NASA budget for rc%carch in computer science, machine
intelligence, and robotics approaching one hundred million
dollars. An expcndlttire of ha l f that would equal the corn.
bi ped annual hudget for this field for ARPA and file
National Silence Foundation. If NASA were selected as
lead ag.r ►c) (or IeaJ civilian agency) for federal research
and development in computer %.fence and technology,
such amounts aught not be at all unpractical. And signiti•
:ant exlknduutes should 1we dctcctahle heneftts in three
to live )'cars, and very dramatic improvements in NASA
programs in IO )-cars. If NASA %+ere to play such a lead
agency role, one of its responsibilities would he to study
the lung-term implications for individuals and for society of
maim advances in m ichlne intelligence and robotics.
Rcci, ►tintendatiim 2. RASA should intru,hfce advanced color
Inter science :ech iologv to its Laarh orbital and I ► ld►trtdr ►
►► r ► srluns, gold sholild dwil phal:e ►rredrill loruxrfi ►►►s with a
multi ►nissfNfl /IwisI
A balance is needed on hoard NASA spa:$craft bct%%een
4lstnhutcd microprocessors .nd a cenualived computer
Although fun.t10n-directed Jistnbution of processors
1111$111 be useful. such ardulectusVS should nut preclude the
use of the%$ computing resources fill unanticipated needs
Diwihuted computer con:ep ts empha%irnlg "tail-soft"
peiforntrn%c should rccci % c Increased attention. For exam-
ple, in the case of failure of a computes chip or a unit, a
long-term goal Is to effect migration of the program and
data to other %%tirklni, parts of the %)stem% Such fall-soft
systems require innovative architectures yet to be devel-
oped. D)-namlcalh ► ccunfigurabic processors A,.h large
redundancy are hadl) needed in NASA.
NASA relies on :50•b:t .umpwci mcniury chips: WOW
hit and (0.0W hit ;hips are currently a%atlable. A million-
bit chip is expected to he available Aithi p
 a few years. The
cost of space-qualification of computer hardware play be
very high, but the possibility exists that high infornation•
density chips inai, alicad) work a.ceptabl% in the space
envitonntent. 11'e iccom mend that ?NASA perform space
qualification tests on the Shuttle elf multiple hatches of
existing inicruprucessurs and mcmury :hips.
These two examples of de •-elopinents in computer science
and technology will ha ve apph.ations to mail) NASA inis-
si' ►ns. i1'c also recommend a tranuuonal nmod tit
 computer %% %tcr i design ill w loch , isting minipro-
cessors and uew amcruprucessur %
 are both utilized, the
furmcr as a cunsctvative guarantor of rchability, the latter
as an aperture to the future.
Table 4 1. R&D of the Big Seven Computer Companies
R&D EXPI \SE
1077 Sa ' •s 1977 Profits Actual As a percent As a perrcnt Cott of
Company in Mill) . 	is in n ► dl►ons ;n mdhons
of Silts of Profits f mpioyees
of do'	 's of dollars of dollars
Il)^i Iv	 33 2,71) 1.142 6.3 42 3682
Spciry Rand 3.270 157 168 5.1 197 1965
llonc^ acll 2,911 134 152 5.2 113 2009
1 %, <'R 2.522 144 118 4.7 82 1845
Hurro ►, ;;hs 2,901 215 122 5.9 57 2386
Control Data 1,493 62 73 4.9 :17 1592
Uittital Eqpt 1,059 109 80 7.5 74 2.118
Cumpo%itc 33.764 3,700 1.995 5.9 43 2752
9
__.
730-51
In planetary cxploratiun, "... it is clear ... thtat more
advanced mission !echniques old instrumentariod are
requited to fulfill the science strategy and ichie%e the
ohJectivcs ..." of intensive study of a planets Surface
luvr • i arid return-sample missions will be requacd to meet
i ill,: scicm,e goals for Mars• the Galilean satellites of Jupiter.
Titan. and perhaps Venus, as sell as for investigation of
such specific locations oii the lunar ► ..rfacc as putative
volatile-ri:it deposits at permanently shaded reg'nns of the
poles. With the exception of the Lunakhod and other
Lulia glass missions of the Soviet Union, there is little
experience with such Systems. Because of the lung lead
tunes and the complex nature of rover missions, they pro-
vide ill testing ground for the implvinentation of the
ntultnnission focus of+7ome of our recommendations.
Recommendation 3 Mission objectives ihould he designed
flexibl y to take adiantage of existing and likely- fliwe tech-
nologic•al opportunities.
flardsvare should be designed to exploit state-of-the-art
software and likely near-future software developments.
- Adoption of this recommendation impli:s a careful re-
e\arnination of missions currently in the planning stages.
This recommendation applies not only to spacecraft systems
but to ground-baud computer systems as %sell. The man/
machine interface, both in Shuttle s y stems and iii mission
o1wratiuns ground equipment. Ila< nut, in our Opinion.
been optimized. hl routine mission operations, particularly
lit mission crisis ni inagenien , there is a severe short-teini
con+petitiun for human attention and intellectual resources.
The problem is a combinatorial one, requiring s) steniatic
and exhaustive fai,ure-mode analysis. which c.,n be opti-
mally piovided by computer systems. via a prubahtbty
analysis. atialogous to existing computer programs in niedr-
cal diagnosis. Ill to their value lit rnanae-
ment. such computer systems will leaf to the optimization
of iubsequent missions.
Recommendation -l. A'ASA should adopt the 1011owing plait
of ac•tiou:
(a) Establish a fi(wus for computer science arid technology
at A'ASA lltadquarters for coordinating R&D ac•tivitics.
'the pace of advance in computer science and tech-
	
nology is so great that even experts ill 	 field hash
v difficulty keeping up with advances and fully utilizing
them. The problem is, of course. much more severe for
those who are not experts in the field. By establishing
5 /hid, P. 39.
a program in crnuputer science- , NASA can ensure that
there is a rapid transfer of new technology to NASA
programs. Space exploration offers a unique environ.
anent ill to develop and test advanced concepts
in this discipline.
This lease s to the following specific recommendation:
NASA should consider Computer Szience arid Tech-
nology sufficiently vital to its goals to treat the subject
as ail independem area of study. The specific cuncc-us
of this field, enu,nerated below, should become research
and technology issues within NASA oil same basis
as propulsion techrialogy, materials science, planetary
science, atmospheric physics, etc. This means the
creation of a discipline office for ..oinputer science
with interests ui the nia)or subdisciplines of the field
and w uh appropriate contacts within NASA. A suitable
budget and program of research and technology grants
,rnd contracts would provide the focus in this field the
Study Group has found lacking in NASA. (hi the one
hand, it would help stake the outstanding workers in
the field aware of and interested in serving NASA's
needs. Graduate students pa:ticiparing in such a
research program would become a source of future
eniplo\ees at NASA centers and contractors. Oil
Other hand, it svuuld provide NASA Headquarters
with a better awareness of the potential contributions
of computer science to its piogratos. To be effective,
the initial operating budget of such a program should
not be below 10 milliun dollars a year, with a lung-tei ni
coniniament for at le-ist a constant level of funding in
real dollars.
Most of the fundamental research under such a program
would he carried out at universities and at appropriate
NASA centers. Collaboration with industry should be
encouraged to expedite technolugy transfer. To meet
the emerging mission requirements. parallel advanced
development programs within all of NASA's mission
offices are required.
Following is a list of problem areas that should set
son e goals for both the basic science research program
and the advanced development effort:
• Smart sensing: automated content analysis; stereo
mapping for eventual Earth and planetary applica-
tions.
• M3flipUlator desi gn, particularly for autonomous
use. including structures anal effectors, force and
touch detectors.
10
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• Control Arid F dback systems. Particularly those
relevant to manipulation and teleoperator develop-
IIICIIL
• Spacecraft cr isis analysts systems.
• Locomotion systems, particularly lcp;cd hsnotin-oion
for difficult terrain.
• Attempts at space qualification of multiple batchrr
of existing microprocessors .ind ►nentory chips.
• Preliminary studies of automatic and teleoperator
assembly of large structures for Faith orbital, lunar,
and asteroidal environments.
• Vision systems, particularly for use in locomotion
Aid automated assembly.
• Control and reasoning systems, particularly III
support of lunar and planetary covets.
• Computer architectures for space systems
• Software tools for space system development.
• A t °^rithnt	 analysis	 fur	 critical	 space related
pi	 W%.
• Computer networks and computer-aided telecon-
ferencing. (See paragraph (d) below.)
The current university-based support front and
ARPA in computer science and machine intelligence
is about 15 mullion dollars each annuall y . The level of
university funding recommended her; would he larger
by about 30 percent, allossing NASA to compete effec-
tively for the best taient and ideas. Parallel programs
conducted by NASA program offices, which would be
based strongly at NASA centers and industry, would
approximately double the suppo ► requirement. The
total support migh , eventually approach the 100 mil•
lion dollar level, if NASA were seriously to pursue a
broad program of research in computer science.
(b) Augment the advisory stnccture of NASA by addit,j
computer scientists to implement tire foregoing
reconrnrcndatio ns.
NASA is far enough behind the leading edge of the
computer science field that major improvements in
its operations can be made immediately using e.,,isting
computer science systems and techniques such as
tnoder ► data abstraction languages, time-sharing, inte-
grated program develupn,ent environments, and larger
virtual mernory computc , s (especially for onboard
processing). Such general improvements ur sophistica-
tion an: almost a prerequisite fora later utllriauon of
machine intelligence and robotics in NASA activities.
'Me advisory organizations should help plan and
cooidinate NASA's effort III the field and estabhsh
contacts with the centers of computti cience research.
(c) Because of the connection Of the Defense Alapping
Agency is (D,11A ) Mot Digital Operations 1 roject with
A'A.SA interests. RASA should maintain appropriate
hais-m.
I)MA has stud i ed the advanced techniques ; n computer
science with in emphasis on machine Intelligence.
There may be a strong relationship between many
I)MA concern, and related issues in NASA, particu-
larly in scene analysts and understanding, large data-
base maiiagemctit, and information retrieval. An
evaluation by NASA of the DMA plannin g.
 process
associated with the DMA Pilot Digital Operations
Project should aid in estimating the costs of NASA's
development to this field.
(d) NASA should jorm a task group to examine- the
desirabilitt-, fcasibilirv, and genet tl specification of an
all-digital, text-handling, intellig,vrt corwnurrication
systcm.
A significant amount of NASA's budget is spen, in
the transfer of information among a very con•plex,
geographically and institutionally disparate ,et of
groups that need to exchange messages, ideas, require-
ments, and documents quickly to keep inforiaed, plan
activities, and arrive at decisions.
Based on a rough estimate, we predict that such an
all-digital network would lead to signif.cant improve-
ments over the present method of ca.ryutg out these
functions. In addition to the cost savings, there would
be improvements in performance. t,lthough it would
riot eliminate the use of paper an ►I
 ntee,ings as a means
of communica,ton, it would sa l e tons of paper and
millions of man-miles of energy consunung travel 71is
system would facilitate and improve the participation
of scientists in all phases of missions as well as enhance
their ahility to extract trite must value from postntission
data analysis.
11
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I he implementation of such a system would riot be
prcklWalctl un new deselopments in artificial ► ntelh•
fence, but on (lie tools that are in comn ►on use at
artificial intelligence nudes of the ARPA network and
arc part of the developing technology of digital mfor•
matron and word 1. ucessmg. If such a development
w,re carried out, it would provide the data baw for
sophisticat-d techniques, as they become available,
for information retrieval, semantic search, and decision
making: arid a model for other public and 1mvile
organizations, scientific, technological, and Industrial.
The task group to investigate this development should
include elements of NASA management, mission plan-
Wing and uperatiuns, scientific investtgators, and
infurmauun scienv ts, as well as %pecralists in artitic:al
intelligence.
12
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Appendix
An Overviow of Applications of Machine Intelligence
and Robotics in the Space Program"
Intraduction
'I he space program is at the threshold of a new era that may
he distinguished by ;I capable space transportation sys-
teln. In the 198us. the Space Shuttle and its adjuncts will ell•
able in,: , ca%cd activities in the scientific exploration of the
universe and a broadened approach to global service undertak-
ings in space. -1 he first steps toward utilizing the space environ-
ment for industrial arid commercial ventures will become
possible and call requrenlcnts for more advanced space
transportation systems in the 1990s. This will enable expanded
Space Industrial activities and,by the end of this century, could
lead to Satellite Power Systems for solar energy production.
to lunar or asteroidal bases fur extracting and prices ing
material ► csources, and to manned space stations for conl-
ineicial processing and nlanufacturine in space. A major objec-
tive for NASA is to develop the enabling technology and to
redu:c the costs for operating such large-s:alc systems during
the next two decades. Oil potential NASA missions
in this tame frame we expect that machine intelligence and
robotics technoloy will he a vital contributor to the cost-
effective implementation and operation of the requited :%s-
tems. In some areas, it will make the system teasible, not oo;y
for technological reasons. but also lit 	 of commercial
acceptability and affordability.
Dming the nexc two decades. the space progrann will shift
at least sonic emphasis from exploration to utilization of the
pace environment. It is expected that this shaft will be ac,:Im-
panicd by a large increase in re(Iuttenlents for s) stem opera-
tions ml space and oil the ground. calling for general-purpose
automation (robotics) and specialized automation. %%'hat
operations. tasks, and functions must be automated, and to
11hat degree. to accomplish the NASA objectives with the
most cost-effective systems?
Robots and Automation
in NASA Planning
Whereas nleclianical power pruvides physical amplifi.-Aion
and computers provide intellectual amplification, telecunl-
nlunication provides anlplifrr.atiun of the space accessible to
I•.acvrptcd 1'runl New Luster for Space Robots and Automation, by
I.. licit. Astronauti:s & Aer+m.utics, September 1978.
humans. By means of telecommunication, humans can activate
and control systems at remote places. They can perform tasks
even as far away as the planets. During the 19bOs, tills became
knovlrl as telcop.lalion Teleoperalors are mall-Illachllle
systems that aUg ►llellt arid extend human sensory, manipu-
lative, and cognitive abilities to remote places. Ir. this context,
the terra robot can then be applied to the remote system of a
teleuperator, if it has at least some degree of autonomous
sensing, decision-making, and/or action capability. The con-
cept of teleoperation has profound significance in the space
program. Because of the large distances involved, almost all
space missions fall within the teleoperator definition: and,
because of the resultant :unitnunication delay for many
1111 1 sions, the remote system requires autonomous ca`abihiies
for effective operation. The savings of operations time for
deep space nlissiOns can 11 CCO111e trel11elldoU5, if the MIMIC
%stern is able to accomplish its tasks with minitnum ground
support For example, it has been estimated that a Mars roving
vehicle would be Operative only 4 percent of the time in a
so-called nluve-and-wait mode of operation. With adequate
robot technology, it should be Operative at Fast 80 percent of
the tune.
NASA save the Iced to examine the civilian role of the U.S.
space program doling the last q.larter of this century. A .cries
of planning studies and workshops was initiated with the Out-
look for Space Study in 1974. which included a complehen•
live forecast Of space technology for I Q SO-'000. In a subse-
quent NASA 1 0AST Space Theme Workshop. the technology
fc: casts were applied to three broad mission themes: space
exploration, global services, and space industrialization. Based
on the derived requirements for cost-effective space mission
operations. five new directions were identified for develop•
nients uI computer systems, machine mtclhgence and robotics
I I I automated operations aimed at a tenfold reduction in
mission support costs: (2) precision puanting and control;
(?) efficient data acquisition to permit a tenfold increase in
in formation collection needed for global covera ge: (41 real-tinge
data manacement: and (5) low-cost data distribution to allow
a Ihousand -fold increase tin information availability and
space-systems effectiveness. The machine intelligence arid
automation technologies for data acquisitiutt, data processing,
information extraction, and decision making emerge here as
the major drivers in each area and call for their systematic
development. Ill for c e rtain areas such as automated
operations in space, the mechanical technolusies directed at
A•1
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n ► alciijls and ohjrcts acquisition, handling, and assembly
rnu"t .Ilse Fie Wither developed, rebuts doing coimitiction
walk In Farth orbit or oil 	 lunar surface will need mjmpu-
Iatlse and loconlution devices to 1wiforin the necessary trans-
port .old hjndhng operjtions.
Future Applications
In ,pace jp, licat;ons, robots nijy take on many terms.
None looks like the popular science fiction conception of a
n►ech.uucal man. Their jppejrjnce follows strictly functional
lines, satisfying the requirements of the mission objectives to
be accomplished. The discussion which follows briefly presents
m ► s?,ton categories, mission objectives, and system character-
istics pertinent to space robot and automation technology.
Estimates of technology development efforts to auton ► jte
system functions are given in Table A'1.
A. Space Exploration
Space exploration robots may he exploring space front
Earth orbit as orbiting telescopes, or they may be nlanetjry
flyby and/or orbiting spacecraft like the Alaruter and Pioneer
families. They may be stationary linden with or without
manipulators like the Sur y-yor and the Viking spacecraft, or
they may be wheeled like the Lunakhod and the proposed
Mars ;overs. Others may he penctiaturs, tlyen, or bjll•, ►ons.
and some may bring science sample, hack to Firth (Figures
A•1 - A•3). All call acyujre scjenutic and engineering data
41: a y
f 4
Figure A 1. Galileo spacecraft navigates between Jupiter and Galilean
satellites in render-rig. After sending a probe into the jovian
atmosphere, the robot spacecraft will perform complex
maneuvers at various inclinations with repeated close
encounters with the satellites.
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Figure A 2. Mars surface robot will operate for 2 years and travel about
1000 km performing experiments automatically and send
ing the scientific information bark to Earth.
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Figure A-3. Artist's concept of a Mars surface scientific p rocessing and
sample return facilit y . Anpldnes transport samples into the
vicinity of the processing station. Tetnered small rovers
then bring the samples to the station for appropriate
analysis and return to Earth.
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UrI "-' , QUALITY, Table A-1. Estimates of the technology development efforts to
automate system functions
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A(Y. THE AUTOMAT I ON Of THE IDENTIFIED SYSTEM FUNCTIONS REQUIRES
/ INTEGRATION OF EXISTING TECHNOLOGY	 MAJOR TECHNCLOGY CEV(LOPM(NTS
X MODERATE ADCITIONAI DEVELOPMENTS	 e MAJOR TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS WITH UNCERTAIN GL/TCOM(,
(XTINSIVE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS	 NOTE. V I ENTRY RE ►RISINTS THE RELATIVE COLLECTIVE LEVEL OF EFFORT TO
CCG N►IISH THE FUNCTION FOR THE MISSIONS AS DESCRIBED IN THE
NASA DAST SPACE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY N.OD(L, i1 MARCH 1978•
1) THE LUNAR FOVERS OF THIS PROGRAM WILL RI DEVELO PED WITH IN-SPACE HANDLING
CAPA.1ILITIE5 AND WILL SUPPORT THE LUNAR PRECURSOR PROCESSOR 0990) AND THE LUNAF IASI 11948),
t) HANDLING FUNCTIONS ARE GENERALLY ASSOCIATED WITH AAO11ILITY UNITS, L.ANI►ULAINI DEVICES
OR TOOLS REQUIRING CONTROL OF ACTUATORS
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tismg their sensors, process the data with their computers, piJi
.utd makv decisions, and send samte Of the data back to Earth.
Smiw robots are in addition able to piopei themselves safely to
difterent places and to use actuators, manipulators and tools
to acquire samples, prepare them, experiment in situ with
them or bring them back to Earth.
Fxploratoty robots are required to send back must of the
collected scientific data, unless they become repetitive. The
unknown space environment accessible to the sensors is trans-
lated into a different, still uninterpreted environment, in the
form of computer data banks oil 	 These data banks -rte
then accessible for scientific investigation long after the space
mission is over.
Projections into the future lead one to speculate oil
possibility of highly autonomous exploratory robots in space.
Such exploratory robots would communicate to Earth only
when contacted or when a significant event occurs and requires
immediate attention on Earth. Otherwise, they would collect
the data, make appropriate decisions, archive them, a-d store
them on board. The robots would serve as a data bank. and
their computers would be remotely operated by accessing arrd
programming them from Earth whenever the communication
link to the robot spacecraft is open. Scientists would be able
to interact with the robvt by remote terminal. Indeed, the
concept of distributed computer systems. presently under
investigation in many places, could provide to each instrument
Its own microcomputer, and scientists could communicate
with their respective r I .intents. They could perform special
data processing on board and request the data to be coma nuni-
cited to them in the form desired. Alternatively, they could
retrieve particular segments of raw data and perform the
require„ manipulations in their own facilities on Earth.
I'nme elements in this link f etween scientists and distant
exploratory robots would be large antenna relay stations in
geos^nchronous orbit. These stations would also provide da!a
handling and archiving services. especially for inaccessible
exploratory robots, e.g.. those leaving the solar system.
B. Global Services
Global service robots orbit the Garth. They differ .`runt
exploratory robots primarily in the intended application of the
collected data. They collect data for public service use on soil
conditions, sea states, global crop conditions, weather. geology.
dn.tstcrs, etc. These robots generally acquire and process an
immense amount of data. However, only a fraction of the data
is of interest to the ultimate user. At the sarne time, the user
often likes to have the information shortly after it hit been
obtained by the spacecraft. For instance, the value of weather
information is short-lived except for possible historical reasons.
The value of information of disasters such as forest fires is of
comparably short duration. The demand for high•vulurne
on-board data processing and pertinent automated information
extraction is therefore great.
The usual purpose of global service robots is to collect
tlrnc•dependent data in the Earth's environment, whose static
properties are well-known. The d: ► ta are used to determine
specific patterns or classes of characteristics and translate
these into useful information. For instance, for Eandsat
and Seasat (Figure A->•), the data are currently sent to the
ground. where they are processed. reduced, annotated, analy•
zed, and distributed to the user. This process requires up to
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Figure A-4. Seasat. The oceanograph-c satellite's high-data rate Synthe-
tic Aperture Radar imaging device has provided data on
ocean waves, coastal regions, and sea ice.
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-+ Ilivaths for a fully pn ►cessed satellite image and costs several
Ilnoownd dollars. The image must then he interpreted by the
trcrner, i.e., thi Information must still he extracted by the
user.
Present deselopnnenis in artillClal inte1110l,ce, ►nachrrie
int:lhgence and robotics suggest that, in the future, the ground.
based data processing and information extraction functions
will he performed tin board the robot spacecraft. Only the
useful Information would be sent to the ground and distnhutcd
to the users, while most of the col l ected data could he dis-
carded imnnediately. This would require tine robot to be able
to decide what data must he retained and how they "ere to
be processed to provide the user still the desired inturnratim:
For instance. the robot could hasc a large number of pattern
classification templates stored in its memory or introduced
by a user %%-till a particular purpose in mind. These templates
would represent the characteristics ul objects and/or features
of interest. The computer would compare the scanned pat-
terns with those stored In its memory. As soon as something of
interest appeared, it would examine it with higher resolution,
comparing it to a progressively narrower class of templates
until recognition had hce!n established to a sufficient degree of
confidence. The robot would then contact the appropriate
ground station and report its findings arid, if required. provide
the user "'ith an annotated printout or Image. The user would
be able to interact with the robot. indeed "Ith his particular
instrument, by remote teti ninal much the same as "'ith a cen-
iral computer and, depending on Intermediate results, modify
subsequent processing.
For space exploration and gl,.bal services, the ground-
based mission operations can become extremely complex. A
recent example of a planetary exploration mission, and perhaps
the most complex to date, is Viking. At times there were
seseral hundred people invol ved tin science data analysis,
mission planning, spacecraft monitoring, command sequence
generation, data archiving, data distribution, and simulation.
Although for earlier space missions sequencing had been deter-
mined in advance, on Viking this was done adaptively during
the mission. The operational system was designed so that
major changes in the mission needed to be defined about
16 days before the spacecraft activity. Minor changes could he
made as late as 12 hours before sending  command. The turn-
around time of about 16 days and the numher of people
involved contributes, of course, to sharply increased opera-
tional costs. The Viking operations costs (Figure 2 . 1) are for a
3-month mission. The planned Mars surface rover missio. , Is
expected to last 2 years, covering many new sites on the Afar
tian surface. Considering that this mission xould be more
connple x and eight times as long, ground operations would have
to be at least ten times as efficient to stay within, or close to,
the same relative costs as for Viking.
Outing the Viking mission, about 75.(1(x) reels of Image
data tapes "ere cullcctcd and stored in many separate loca-
tions The images are now identifiable only by the tune "hen
and the location "here thry were taken. No mdicatiun regard,
ing linage infoiniatiun content is provided, and the user "III
have to scan catalogs of pictures to find "hat he or she wants.
For such reasons, it is expected that most of the data "III not
be used again
The ground operations for Faith orbital missions suffer
from problems similar to those of planetary dissions, The
overall data stream is usually much higher for Earth orbital
missions. Images are still very costly, and they take up to
several months to reach the user.
these considerations tiongly suggest that technology
must he developed so that most ground operation activities
can be performed as close as possible to the sensors where the
data is collected, namely by the robot in space. liowever,
exanuning the various ground operations in detail, we con-
clude that most of those that must remain on the ground could
also he automated with advanced machine Intelligence tech-
niques. The expected benefits derived from this would be a
cost reduction for ground operations of at least an order of
magnitude and up to three orders of magnitude for user-ready
Image Information.
C. Utilisation of Space Systems
Space industrialization requires a bto.,der spectruni of
robotics arid automation capabilities than those Identified for
space exploration and global services. The multitude of sys-
tenis and widely varying activities envisioned in space until
the end of this century will require the development of space
robot and automation technology,
 on a broad scale. It Is here
that iobot and automation technology will have its greatest
economic Impact. The systems under consideration range from
large antennas and processing and manufacturing stations in
Earth orbit to lunar bases, to manned space stations, to
satellite power systems of up to IUU km 2 . These systems are
not matched in site by anything on Earth. Their construction
and subsequent maintenance will require technologies not yet
in use for similar operations on Farth.
Space processing, requires a sophisticated technology. First
it must be developed arid perfected, and then it must be trans-
ferred into the commercial arena. Basic types of processes
currently envisioned include solidification of melts without
convection or sedimentation, processing of molten samples
without containers, diffusion in liquids and vapors,and electro-
phoretic separation of biological substances. It is expected
that specialized automated instrumentation %sill he developed
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for remote control once t'te particulars of these processes are
worked out and the pictisure of commercial requircmenti;
becomes noticeable.
Lart;e-atra systems such as I.ugc space antennas, satellite
power systems, and span stations require large-scale and
complex construction facthties in space (Figures A-5 and A-6).
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Figure A 5. Large space systems require robot and automation tech-
nology for imbrication, assembly, and construction in
space.
Relatively small systems, up to 100 to w extent, may he
deployable and can he transported into oft It with one Shuttle
load. For intermediate systems of sr;veral hu,tdied mater: In
extent, it hecomes practical to shuttle the structural elements
into space and assemble therm on site (Figure A-7).
Very large systems require heavy-lift launch vehicles which
will bung bulk material to a construction platform (Figure
A•8), where the structural cornponents are nranufa.ttired u.-Ing
specialized automrted machines.
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Fiyure A 7. Construction of a space station. bulk material t • brought
by the Shuttle. Structural elements are fabricated at the
construction facility and then assembled ny remotely
controlled manipulators.
54
Figure A-6. Large space antennas are erected with the help of a
space based construction platform. The Shuttle brings the
structural elements to the platform, where automatic
manipul a tor modules under remote control perform the
assembly.
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Figure A S. Complex construction facility in space with automatic
beam builders, cranes, manipulators, etc., is served by the
Shuttle.
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Me structural elements call 	 handled b^ teleoperated
of %elf•actuating cranes and manipulators which bring the cum-
ponents Into place and loin them ( Figure A-q ). Fite—flying
robots will transport the structural entities betsseen the Shuttle
or the fabrication %lie .tnd their filial de s-tlllatioln and comiect
then) Thcac opewlion, require a sophisticated general-purpuw
handling capahihty. In addition to transporting structural
e:enlcnts, the robot must have manipulators to handle theist,
and ssork wtth them and on them. Larg,s structural sui•sys•
terns must be nnosed from placeplace to place and attacheJ it) ca,h
other This usually requires rende1vous, stationkeeping. and
docking operations at several puuiis simultaneously and will
high precision -- a problem area ,till not mvestigatl:d for ecru
gravity. Automated "smart" tools would also he required by
astronauts to perform speciahted local tasks.
lht:se robot systems could he controlled remotely as
teleoperator devices. or they could he under supen-isun,
c•onlind with intermittent human operator snvolscnient. Astro-
nauts ill space or human caper ► .iris can Earth will need the tools
to accomplish the envisioned prugranis. the technology for
in-space assembly and constiuctiun will pruside the founds•
tion for the development of These space-age tools.
After the system has been constructed• its subsequent
operation will requite service functions that should he per-
formed by free-tlNutg robots or by robots attached to the
structure 'the functions which such a robot should he able to
perform in, lude ^.ahbtation. checkuut, data rctrie%A, resupply.
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Figu re A 9. Space construction of large antenna systems will'-. auto
mated tools, teleoperateo manipulators, and free flying
robots.
maintenance, repair, replacement of parts, cargo and crew
transfer, and recovery of spacecraft.
During and after construction, there should he a robot on
standby for rescue operations. An astronaut drifting into space
could he brought back by a free-lying robot Such devices
could also he in stand-by alert in the ground. The delivery
system for these rescue robots need not be man-rated. They
call expendable life Support %)sterns or encapsulate the
astrtmaut ni a life support environment for return to a shuttle.
space station• of Earth. Thcy could also perform first aid
functions.
Another phase of space Industrialization calls for a lunar
or asteroidal base. After a Surface site surse) with robot (rosct
vehicles, in autuni.ited piccursur processor s) stun could be
placed on the Moon or the asteroid. This system would collect
solar energy and use it in experimental. automated pit) ical/
chemical proctsses for extracting volatales, oxNgen, metals,
and glass frurn lun y sutl delisered h) automated rosers (Fig.
lire A-1 I I. The products would he stored, slowly building up
stocupiles cat preparation for constnlcuon. The lunar or
asteroidal base would he built using automated equipment and
robots as ill 	 orbit. After construction, general-purpose
robot desices would be necessary for maintenance atrJ repair
operations. Ill 	 the base would use industrial automa-
tion (qualified for operation in space) or a sort generally
similar to those employed oil 	 for similar tasks.
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Figure A 10. Automated material processors un the lunar surface are
serviced by robot v^h,cles with raw lunar sull.
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